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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF -UTAH 
POWER-TRAIN, INC., and 




PAUL M. STUVER, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 14302 
B R I E F O F A P P E L L A N T S 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order granting 
Respondents Motion to Dismiss the above-entitled action. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
An order granting the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 
was entered on the 17th day of September, 197S. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the order of the trial court 
dismissing the above-entitled action vacated and the cause 
remanded for trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 1, 1974, Paul M. Stuver, Defendant-Respondent 
herein, brought an action as plaintiff in the Superior Court 
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of the State of California for the County of Humboldt, Docket * 
No. 56571, against Jack H. Wynn, Power-Train, Inc., Plaintiffs-
Appellants herein, and Does I through X inclusive. The sole 
and exclusive relief sought by Mr. Stuver as plaintiff in the 
California action was the rescission of two assignment agree-
ments. The first agreement (Exhibit "A" in the California action, 
Record 96), assigns from Mr. Stuver to Mr. Wynn Letters Patent 
No. 3,090,363 in the United States Patent Office, pertaining 
to a so-called "Mini-Sam11 fluid drive motor. The second agreement 
(Exhibit "B" in the California action, Record 103), assigns 
from Mr. Stuver to Mr. Wynn all rights, including letters 
patent, to a unique high volume, moderate pressure, radial 
i 
piston hydraulic pump and braking system which will compliment 
the Power-Train ("Mini-Sam") motor..." Both agreements contain 
provisions that they are to be "construed in accordance with 
i 
and governed by the laws of the State of Utah." (Record 21, 
28). 
Mr. Stuver's complaint in the California action alleges 
i 
as grounds for rescission breach by Mr. Wynn, Power-Train, 
and Does I through X of various provisions of the two assignment 
agreements above-described, including, among others, covenants 
by said defendants to pay certain cash amounts to Stuver, certain 
expenses of Stuver, certain royalties and certain stock rights 
in other corporations, and to employ Stuver to assist in the 
production of the inventions to which he had assigned his rights. 
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Mr, Wynn and Power-Train, Inc., filed an answer as defen-
dants to the California action on December 10, 1974. It denied 
generally the allegations of Mr. Stuver's complaint. In addi-
tion, it set up as affirmative defenses Mr. Stuver's failure 
to make a legally sufficient offer of restitution, failure 
of constructive conditions of cooperation under the assignment 
agreements, misrepresentations by Stuver with respect to the 
legal integrity, performance and cost characteristics of the 
inventions assigned, and a broadly worded affirmative defense 
of "willful and wanton11 conduct by Mr. Stuver resulting in 
harm to the defendants. The Appellants' answer in the California 
action contained no counterclaim. 
On June 23, 1975, Appellants commenced this action 
against the Respondent. They based their prayer for damages 
on fifteen separate counts of tortious conduct, ranging from 
the Respondent's misrepresentations with respect to the inven-
tions assigned, their manufacturing costs, etc., to tortious 
interference with the Appellants' contract relations, inter-
ference with their prospective advantage, appropriation 
of trad; ecrets, industrial sabotage and champerty. 
Thereafter, the Respondent filed his Motion to Dismiss 
on the ground that the action pending in California involved 
the same parties and the same issues and, therefore, the prior-
ity principal applied to the present action and required its 
dismissal. 
The trial court adopted the argument of the Respondent 
-3-
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and dismissed this action on the grounds that all the allega-
tions in Appellants' Complaint were properly compulsory counter-
claims under California law, and as a matter of judicial comity 





IF THE CALIFORNIA ACTION WERE FOUND TO INVOLVE THE 
IDENTICAL PARTIES, ISSUES AND RELIEF AS THE PRESENT 
ACTION SUCH FINDING WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE GROUNDS 
FOR DISMISSING THE PRESENT ACTION. 
The trial court has misapplied the familiar Tlpriority i 
principal11 which states the general rule of law that the pen-
dency of a prior action in a court of competent jurisdiction 
within the same state, between identical parties, involving i 
the identical cause of action and seeking identical relief, 
wherein all of the rights of the parties thereto may be fully 
and finally determined, may be asserted as a grounds for dis- 4 
missal. 1 Am. Jur. Abatement and Revival, Sec. 14. 
But 
The pendency of a prior suit in one state 4 
cannot be pleaded in abatement or in bar 
to a subsequent suit in another state 
even though both suits are between the same 
parties and upon the same cause of action.... 
[Although a] judgment rendered in one is, of 
course, when pleaded, a bar to further 4 
prosecution of the other action. (1 Am-Jur. 
Abatement and Revival, Sec. 39.) 
Chicago R.I. § P.R.Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611 (1927); Dodge 
v- Superior Court, 139 Cal.178, 33 P.2d 695 (1934); Upton * 
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v. Heiselt Construction Co,, 3 Utah2d 170, 280 P.2d 971 (1955); 
53 A.L.R. 1265; Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, Sec. 86. 
There is no substantive distinction between "abatement'' and 
"dismissal" of an action. 1 Am. Jur.2d Abatement and Revival, 
Sec. 1. 
The trial court based its dismissal of the present 
action on the precise ground that there was an action pending 
in another state, involving the same parties and the same issues, 
which the authorities have universally held to be impermissible 
grounds for dismissal. This Court must, therefore, vacate 
the order of the trial court dismissing the present action. 
POINT II 
A STAY OF THE PRESENT ACTION PENDING THE CONCLUSION 
• .OT~THF~CALIFORNIA ACTION IS CLE"XRLY INAPPROPRIATE, 
The issue of whether or not a stay of the present action 
pending the conclusion of the California action is not directly 
presented by this appeal. The Respondent has not moved for 
such relief and the trial court not awarded it. But, in the 
event that this Court should consider it necessary to first 
determine whether or not a stay of the present action is appro-
priate before remanding this action for trial on the merits, 
the Appellants will demonstrate that such relief is clearly 
inappropriate. 
A court of one state may, in its discretion, stay a 
proceeding pending it before it on the ground that a case 
involving the same parties and issues is pending in another 
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state. Simmons v. Superior Court, 96 Cal-2d 119, 214 P.2d 
844 (1950); 19 A.L.R.2d 301. Such a stay is not available 
to the moving party as a matter of right. Coffey v. Coffey, 
71 S.W.2d 141 (Mo. 1934). 
The general rule empowering a court to stay a local 
action pending the outcome of a foreign action and its rationale 
are summarized in 19 A.L.R.2d 301, Sec. 2 at page 306: 
While judicial comity owing to the courts of 
other states in which the former litigation was pend-
ing is sometimes advanced as a reason for the exercise 
of the power to stay the local proceedings, it is 
apparent that it is not the principal or sole reason, 
since if it were, the power would be exercised (as 
it is not) unconditionally and under all circumstances. 
The real or principal reason for the exercise 
of the power, when it has been exercised, appears to 
be the protection of the defendant from vexatious and 
harassing litigation, where there is no legitimate 
advantage which the plaintiff may gain by bringing 
his suit in more than one jurisdiction.... 
Confirming that this is the rationale for the rule empowering 
a court to stay a domestic proceeding pending the outcome of 
a foreign proceeding is State v. Knehans, 31 S.W.2d 226 (Mo• 
1930), wherein it was stated that: 
The general rule has come to be that the defense 
of a prior suit pending applies only when the plaintiff 
in both suits is the same and both are commenced by 
himself and not to cross-suits by the plaintiff in 
one wrho is the defendant in the other. 
It is plain, then, that the principal reason for empower 
courts to stay a local action pending the outcome of the same 
action in a foreign jurisdiction is to control the potential 
harrassment to which a defendant may be subjected by a plaintiff 
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who proliferates suits against him in various jurisdictions 
in bad faith. It plainly follows that the rationale for the 
rule applies with less force to the situation where the plaintiff 
in the domestic action is the defendant in the foreign action. 
An additional subordinate rationale for empowering courts to 
stay local actions pending the outcome of foreign actions is 
to promote judicial economy by discouraging redundant suits. 
When to authorize a stay of a local action is a policy 
question, and its proper application is not susceptible to 
generalized rules. Application of. that policy depends almost 
entirely upon the facts of the individual case. Muir v. Robinson, 
205 Ind. 293, 186 N.E. 289 (1933). Courts have, however, 
devised some generally accepted tests to determine when a 
subsequent local suit has no legitimate basis as-a separate 
action and is, therefore, considered vexatious. For the priority 
principal to apply, it is deemed necessary that the two actions 
be between identical parties, Kirkpatrick v. Eastern 
Milling and Export Co., 135 F. 144 (D.C. N.J. 1904), that they 
involve identical issues, Slade v. Dickinson, 82 F.Supp. 416 
(D.C. Mich. 1949); Pesquera Del Pacifico S. De P.L. v. Superior 
Court, 89 Cal.2d 738, 201 P.2d 553 (1949); Chappel v. Chappel, 
186 Misc. 968, 60 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1945); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 
71 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1947); and request the same relief, Disbrow 
Mfg. Co. v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 115 Minn. 434, 132 N.W. 
-7-
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i 
915 (1911), such that a decision in one action will render 
all issues in the other res judicata. 
The foregoing test of identity of parties, issues and " 
relief is the one employed when applying the principal of res' 
judicata generally. Essentially the same test, however, is 
used for determining whether an abatement or stay is appropriate 
under the priority principal and for determining whether a 
counterclaim is compulsory or permissive. Where the prerequisites 
of identity of parties, issues and relief are satisfied, the 
trial court is deemed empowered to stay a local action on the 
grounds of a prior pending foreign suit. Chadwick v. Gill, 
16 Del. 127, 141 A. 618 (1927); 19 A.L.R.2d 301, 307-08. i 
The question that must be answered in determining 
whether a stay of the present action is appropriate is, there-
fore, whether ail of the allegations of the Appellants1 complaint 
in the present action are properly defined as compulsory counter-
claims in the California action. 
4 
The California Rules of Civil Procedure, Sec. 426.60 
state: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, if a 
party against whom a complaint has been filed and < 
served fails to allege in a cross-complaint any 
related cause of action which (at the time of serving 
his answer to the complaint) he has against the 
plaintiff, such party may not thereafter in any 
other action assert against the plaintiff the related 
cause of action. i 
Section 426.10(c) clarifies what is meant by "any related cause 
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of action/' It states: 
''Related cause of action11 means a cause of action 
which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence 
or series of transactions or occurrences as the 
cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in 
his complaint. 
In deciding whether all of the allegations of Appellants' 
Complaint filed in the present action would be compulsory or per-
missive counterclaims in the California action, the key phrase 
that must be defined is "arises out of the same transaction, 
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause 
of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint." Under 
authoritative definitions of the phrase "same transaction or 
occurrence" as it is used in the California and similiar compulso 
counterclaim statutes, it cannot be maintained that all of 
the allegations contained in the Appellants' Complaint in the 
present action would constitute compulsory counterclaims in 
the California action. 
Knapp v. Knapp, 15 Cal.2d 237, 100 P.2d 759 (1943) 
illustrates how the "same transaction" test is to be applied. 
There the plaintiff brought an action seeking to share in the 
proceeds from the sale of land in which he and the defendant 
each owned an undivided one-half interest, the defendant holding 
the plaintiff's share for him as trustee. 
The plaintiff had left the state where the land was 
located for an extended period. The defendant eventually sent 
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him a promissory note in the amount of $2,000.00 bearing the 
following inscription: "In full settlement for (plaintiff's) 
interest in the Cucamunga, California orange grove which was j 
owned by payor and payee." The plaintiff alleged that the 
note was part of a scheme by the defendant to abscond entirely 
with the proceeds of the sale of the parcel which actually ' 
amounted to $10,000.00. 
The defendant argued that a prior pending suit brought 
by the plaintiff to recover on the note constituted a suit 
on the same cause of action and,' therefore, the failure of the 
plaintiff to assert his claim for fraud at that time should 
bar his subsequent suit for fraud. 
The court held the cause of action on the note itself 
to be separate from the cause of action for fraud and that, 
therefore, the plaintiff's prior action to recover on the note 
would not operate to bar his action for.fraud though it was closely 
connected with the note. 
Big Cola v. World Bottling Co., 134 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 
1943) contains an instructive definition of the phrase "same-
transaction or occurrence" as employed in a compulsory counterclaim 
statute then in force. There the plaintiff granted the defendant 
a contractual right to manufacture a soft drink concentrate 
according to the plaintiff's secret formula, as well as the 
i 
exclusive right to use a registered name in the sale of the 
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concentrate. Defendant thereafter expended money and effort 
in promotional work and advertising in many states. The plaintiff 
asked for a determination that the contract was void. The 
defendant's answer asserted the validity of the contract, but 
asserted no counterclaim. 
The defendant to the former action subsequently brought 
an independent action against the plaintiff in the former action 
seeking damages on the ground of implied contract. The defendant 
(plaintiff in the former action) moved for abatement of the 
subsequent action on the ground that it involved the same cause 
of action which was the basis of the prior suit, that plaintiff's 
claims were properly compulsory counterclaims in the prior 
suit and could not now serve as the basis of an independent 
action. 
The court held that the plaintiff's cause of action 
on implied contract did not "arise out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's 
claim/1 that it was, therefore, a permissive counterclaim 
which the plaintiff was not obliged to plead in the former 
suit and was now free to assert as the basis of an independent 
action. 
Kerby v. State, 62 Ariz. 294,157 P.2d 698 (1945) con-
tains another instructive application of the "same transaction 
or occurrence" test as employed in interpreting a compulsory 
-11-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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< 
counterclaim statute. There the secretary of state had previously A 
brought an action in mandamus against the state auditor requiring 
the auditor to pay his accrued salary then being withheld by 
the auditor on the ground of illegal payments made by the I 
secretary of state. Subsequently, the auditor brought an action 
against the secretary of state to recover the expenditures 
illegally made. The secretary argued that the auditor's claim 4 
arose from the same transaction or occurrence which was the 
subject matter of the prior suit in mandamus, that it was, 
therefore, a compulsory counterclaim in the prior suit and i 
could not now serve as the basis of an independent action. 
The court held that Arizona's counterclaim statute did 
not apply to bar the auditor's claim since it did not arise I 
from the same transaction or occurrence which was the subject 
matter of the secretary's action in mandamus. 
Another instructive application of the Msame transaction • 
or occurrence" test for determining whether a counterclaim 
is compulsory or permissive is found in Capetillo v. Burress 
and Rogers, 202 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1947). Capetillo was an action * 
brought by plaintiff for damages for wrongful sequestration 
of his truck by the defendants. Defendants had previously 
brought an action against the plaintiff to foreclose a chattel ^ 
mortgage on his truck, causing the truck to be repossessed and 
held for charges. The defendants moved to abate the plaintiff's 
I 
-12-
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action for wrongful sequestration on the grounds that it arose 
out of the same transaction which was the subject matter of 
the prior suit for foreclosure, and was, therefore, properly 
a compulsory counterclaim in the prior action. The court 
rejected the defendants1 argument, holding that the plaintiff's 
wrongful sequestration action was a question of abuse of court 
process and, as such, did not arise out of the transaction 
upon which the foreclosure suit was based. It therefore held 
that the Texas compulsory counterclaim statute was not a bar 
to the plaintiff's wrongful sequestration action. 
Williams v. Robinson, 1 F.R.D. 211 CD.D.C. 1940) also 
illustrates the proper application of the "same transaction or 
occurrence" test to the issue of whether a counterclaim is 
properly defined as compulsory or permissive. There the wife 
of the defendant had previously brought an action against him 
for divorce. In the previous action the defendant had cross-
complained for absolute divorce from his wife on grounds of 
adultery, naming the plaintiff in the principal case as co-respondent. 
The answer filed by the plaintiff in the principal case to 
the husband's cross-complaint in the prior action was limited 
to a general denial of the allegation of adultery. 
Thereafter, the plaintiff in the principal case brought 
an action against the defendant husband for libel and slander. 
The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on 
the grounds that the defendant had failed to assert it as a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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{ 
i 
counterclaim in the prior action for divorce as required by 
Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and was ~ 
now precluded from basing a separate action thereon. ' 
The court rejected the defendant's argument, holding 
that the slander and libel of which the plaintiff complained 
was not part and parcel of the transaction or occurrence that ^ 
was the subject matter of the defendant husband's cross-complaint 
in the previous action for divorce and consequently the plaintiff's 
libel and slander action must be considered a permissive rather 
than a compulsory counterclaim. 
Knapp, Big Cola, Capetillo, and Williams, forcefully 
illustrate that a cause of action will not be deemed to have 
arisen from the "same transaction or occurrence" which was the 
subject matter of an opposing party's cause of action merely 
because a relationship can be shown between the respective 
"transactions." They illustrate that a close analysis of the 
respective "transactions" is required in order to determine 
< 
whether those transactions raise common questions of law sufficient 
to justify a requirement that those questions be determined 
in a single proceeding. 
Specifically with respect to contract actions, the 
authorities have established that certain causes of action 
in contract are to be defined as separate from others though 
the subject matter of both may be the same contract. Many 
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authorities hold, for example, that actions to enforce rights 
under a contract are properly defined as causes of action separate 
from actions to reform, rescind or cancel the same contract. 
For example in National Fire Insurance Company v. Hughes, 
81 N.E. 563 (1907), an insurer brought an action to reform 
a fire insurance policy on the grounds of mutual mistake in 
the description of the insured structures. There was an appeal 
pending from a prior suit by the insured seeking recovery under 
the policy. The insured argued that his prior pending suit 
on the policy was based on the same cause of action as the 
principal suit by the insurer for reformation and, therefore, 
should bar the subsequent suit by the insurer. 
The court held that the cause of action in reformation 
was distinct from the cause of action at law to recover on the 
policy, though both causes of action related to the same con-
tract. Accord, Knapp v. Knapp, 15 Cal.2d 237, 100 P.2d 759 
(1943); State v. Knehans, 31 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. 1930); Strike 
v. Floor, 97 Utah 265, 92 P.2d 867 (1939); Western § Southern 
Life Ins. Co. v. Brenna, 275 Mich. 19, 265 N.W. 512 (1936). 
In summary, the authorities state that a defendant's 
claims against a plaintiff, before they may be defined as compulsory 
counterclaims, must not only be related to the transaction or 
occurrence upon which the plaintiff1s claims against the defen-
dant are based, but must also be closely analyzed to determine 
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i 
if they raise common questions of law that would justify requiring 
all of the defendant's claims to be adjudicated in the proceeding 
brought by the plaintiff. This is particularly true in actions 
confined to the question of rescission, cancellation or reformation 
of contracts. 
The contract case cited in the Memorandum of the Respondent 
4 
in Support of his Motion to Dismiss does not undermine these 
conclusions. In Brunswick Drug Co. v. Springer, 130 P.2d 758 
(Cal. 1942), cited by the Respondent (Record 85), the complaint 
4 
therein simultaneously asserted causes of action for rescission 
and damages under the contract upon which the action was based. 
Under those circumstances, there is little question that the 
i 
defendant's own claims for damages under the same contract 
were held to be compulsory counterclaims. 
Furthermore, the cases cited in said Memorandum of the 
i 
Respondent wherein local actions were stayed on the ground of 
prior pending foreign actions involving the same parties and 
the same issues for reasons of judicial "comity" must be considered 
4 
to represent a minority view. As previously noted, if comity 
were truely the rationale upon which the priority principal 
is based, the authority of a court to stay a local action pending 
the conclusion of an action in a foreign state would be a mandatory 
duty rather than a discretionary power, which the authorities 
unanimously state it is not. (See authorities cited page 6, supra.) 
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The question of whether a stay of the present action 
would be appropriate, then, can only be determined by a close 
examination of the pleadings in the respective actions. Notice 
should first be taken of the factors distinguishing the California 
action from the present action. There is not a strict identity 
of parties, the California action naming Does I through X as 
defendants while there are no such parties named in the present 
action. Two assignment agreements constitute the subject 
matter of the California action, while the subject matter of 
the present action is the tortious acts of the Respondent, 
some related to the agreements upon which the California action 
is based and some unrelated. The relief sought in the California 
action is limited to rescission and restitution, while the 
relief sought in the present action is limited to damages and 
an accounting. 
The fact that the prerequisites, of identity of parties 
and of relief sought are lacking in the present action tends 
to reinforce Appellants' contention that the claims asserted 
in their Complaint herein would be permissive rather than compulsory 
counterclaims in the California action,but the absence of those 
prerequisites is not dispositive. The respective pleadings 
must be further analyzed to determine whether all of the Appellants1 
alleged causes of action arose from the "same transaction or 
occurrence which is the subject matter of the CRespondentfs) 
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{ 
Complaint" in the California action. It must be concluded < 
that they do not. 
The action brought by Respondent as plaintiff in the 
California Superior Court seeks rescission of the assignment ( 
agreements, (Exhibits "A" and "B" in the California action, Record 
96, 103), and restitution, but seeks no other relief. The 
issues raised by Respondent's Complaint, as previously described A 
in Appellants1 Statement of Facts, are the performance or 
non-performance of the respective parties of those assignment 
agreements as that relates to the Respondents right to rescind. i 
The affirmative defenses contained in the Appellants1 answer 
raised the issues of misrepresentation by the Respondent pertaining 
to the inventions assigned, his intentional obstruction of ^ 
Appellants1 business operations and other "willful and wanton" 
conduct as such conduct may relate to failure of constructive 
conditions of cooperation under the agreements. Appellants ' 
in their Answer made no counterclaim. In summary, the "subject-matter" 
of the California action is the two assignment agreements 
described herein. The "transactions or occurrences" arising 
therefrom are the performance or non-performance of those 
agreements as they relate to Mr. Stuver's right to the equitable 
remedy of rescission. 
In contrast, the action brought by Appellants as Plaintiffs 
in the Utah District Court is an action in tort, seeking damages 
and an accounting for fifteen (15) separate counts of tortious 
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conduct by the Respondent. They include misrepresentations 
by Respondent as to the integrity of the patent assigned (Count 
I and II of Appellants1 Complaint), the performance characteristics 
of the inventions assigned (Count XIII) and their manufacturing 
costs (Count V). Such conduct may be considered "transactions 
or occurrences" related to the two assignment agreements which 
constitute the "subject-matter" of the California action and 
may, therefore, be considered to "arise therefrom." 
But Appellants' Complaint also includes allegations 
of champerty (Count XIV), tortious interference with Appellants1 
contract relations with its customers (Count >'.(Y), with its 
prospective advantage with future customers (Count VIII) and 
an accounting for profits realize, from crade secrets appropriated 
by the Respondent (Count XV). Such conduct can be considered 
to have only t,,e most strained and incidental relationship 
to the two assignment agreements which constitute the "subject-matter" 
of the California action, and the conclusion that they "arise 
therefrom" and therefore constitute compulsory counterclaims 
under the California statutes is simply untenable. 
For example, the Appellants1 claim that the Respondent 
has tortiously interfered with its prospective advantage, and 
his claim that the Respondent has conducted industrial sabotage 
has little bearing on the question of the performance or non-
performance of the respective parties of the assignment agree-
ments as that relates to Respondent's right to rescind. They 
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i 
do not constitute a defense to the Respondent's claim for 
rescission and would not be affected by a determination that 
the Respondent has such right. Therefore, these allegations 
in Appellants1 Complaint must considered permissive rather
 i 
than compulsory counterclaims had they been filed in the California 
action for rescission. Least of all can the question of champerty 
by the Respondent be thought to relate to the Respondent's * 
right to rescind or the lack thereof. It presents an entirely 
distinct question of abuse of court process and would therefore 
constitute a permissive rather than a compulsory counterclaim * 
in the California action. Capet^llo v. Buress and Rogers, 
202 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1947); Williams v. Robinson, 1 F.R.D. 
211 (D.D.C. 1940).
 i 
It is clear that Appellants1 Complaint includes several 
allegations that can, at most, be considered permissive counter-
claims had they been asserted in the California action. As per- | 
missive counterclaims, the right of Appellants to bring a 
separate action thereon is uncontestable. This Court should, 
therefore, not only vacate the Order of the trial court, dismissing i 
the present action, but should remand this cause for trial on 
the merits. 
CONCLUSION I 
The Order of the trial court dismissing the present 
action contravenes the universally accepted rule that the 
< 
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pendency of a prior suit in the one state cannot be pleaded 
in abatement or in bar to a subsequent suit in another state, 
even where both suits are brought between identical parties, 
upon identical causes of action and seek identical relief. 
The Order of the trial court must, therefore, be vacated. 
A stay of the present action pending the outcome of 
the California action is clearly inappropriate inasmuch as the 
Appellants' Complaint includes several causes of action that would, 
at best, have been permissive counterclaims if asserted in the 
California action. This Court should, therefore, remand this 
cause for trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ORRIN G. HATCH 
420 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellants 
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